Column of the Day 27th August

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Why we failed in FATA Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Rustam Shah Mohmand

What has gone wrong with FATA? And why is the tribal area in such deep trouble and in the grip of an insurgency? Unless we address these issues sincerely and find answers to these troubling questions, we will be only dealing with the implications of the situation and not resolving the problem.

In 2001, Pakistan took a somersault and a complete U-turn by aligning itself totally and unconditionally with the US led war on terror. Since this was a one man decision, there was no national consensus and no civil society input into this new approach or policy. It consequently lacked strength and substance and did not reflect the aspirations of the people of this country. Because there was no consensus on this policy, no thought was given on how to deal with the consequences that would flow from its execution and what would be the reaction generally and in FATA to a policy of complete submission and subservience to the US dictates and demands. The rules of engagement with the US were thus not settled. It was not realised that the decision would create an unwholesome disconnect between the government and the people. It was also beyond comprehension of the policy-makers to have visualised the convulsive effects of this policy on the tribal areas. No counter insurgency measures were, therefore, worked out to deal with any large-scale resistance.

To make matters worse, the army was inducted in the interior of the tribal areas in 2003. To deploy troops on the border to block infiltration is understandable and would not have produced any sharp and intense reaction. But instead of doing just that, the troops were deployed in the interior of tribal areas in many causes substituting for the Frontier Corps personnel. This was an affront to the traditions and honour of the tribesmen who clearly began to see a connection between American policy and Pakistan's role in promoting America's agenda.

As if the deployment of the troops in the hinterland of FATA was not enough provocation, the local administration and the political agent was totally sidelined. Shots were being called from Peshawar and all major decisions with regard to the deployment, role, duties of the troops and their interaction with the tribes were taken at the provincial HQ without involving the civil administration. This led to a profound distortion in the assessment of the situation, because the ground realities were totally ignored in the absence of the valuable advice that political agent alone was competent in providing. Soon it became common practice to send helicopter gunships or airforce jets to bomb the militants' positions. Collateral damage would follow, driving more people into the lap of the militants.

In any such emergency, governments and administrations have throughout used the tribes to promote a certain policy and deliver a defined outcome. But for that to happen there would be no credibility gap between the tribes and the government. But in our euphoria and enthusiasm to win US support, we allowed the credibility gap to widen. This resulted in the tribesmen becoming totally disenchanted with the government. The only institution that they have known and respected i.e. the institution of the political agent was being demolished creating on administrative vacuum at a time of a great crisis. In such period of crisis, invigorated institutions can only deliver. Regrettably, on the one hand, we helped create a divergence of perception between the people and the government and on the other hand, began to demolish the institution which could have played a role in containing the damage. Sadly, this gruesome spectacle was being played while all the major actors were completely oblivious to the appalling rise of hatred and hostility that this policy was engendering. The folly began to perpetuate itself.

As time passed, we were being sucked into a vortex of self-perpetuating violence which our ill-conceived and badly execution policy was helping to breed and nurture. The stage was set for the emergence on the tribal landscape of groups of militants. Even when it became apparent that insurgency is sweeping the tribal areas, no effort was made to comprehend the dynamics of the situation objectively. Half hearted attempts were made to conclude peace agreement. Lopsided measures tended to spread confusion and contributed to the growing loss of faith amongst tribesmen in the ability of the government to redress their grievances and help resolve the conflict.

Now that the problem has assumed ominous proportions, yet another shortcut solution is envisaged to be put in practice: military operations based on actionable intelligence. Military operations would achieve quick results leaving many people to believe that the problem would soon be over. But once again, we would be unmindful of the long term damage that may be caused to the body politic of the tribal area and its awful implications for peace and tranquillity.

A long-term approach would take into account the resurrection of the systems and institutions. It would focus on working through the tribes. With that end in view, the image of the tribal elders would be restored. The decision making process would have to be decentralised. The institution of the political agent would have to be equipped, strengthened and more importantly its image restored in the eyes of the tribesmen. Each tribe and section of the tribe would have to be engaged in meaningful, purpose oriented talks leading to tangible agreements. This would automatically insolate the Al Qaeda militants. The 'Riwaj' provides quick and comprehensive solution to persons of undesirable credentials and foreign militants on the soil of 'Quam' or tribe. This is feasible because it represents as institutionalised approach to deal with any group of people who are regarded by the political agent as unwelcome settlers in his area of jurisdiction.

The government cannot cede its territory to any militant group nor can it allow any parallel administration to emerge and take hold in any pocket of any tribal area. But this will be brought about by working through the systems, through the tribes. The credibility gap will be removed if the government were to decide, after agreements have been reached with different tribes, to withdraw the troops from the tribal area and allow the Frontier Corps and Khasadars to assume the duties that the law requires them to perform. The government at the same time, in order to make Pakistan's sovereignty meaningful, will have to revisit and reappraise its policy of supporting the war on terror. While the support can continue, Pakistan should not be expected to underwrite the security of the Afghan government or accept internal instability as a cost of such participation.



The writer is former chief secretary of NWFP


A dishonourable exit Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Asif Ezdi

Zardari has done it again. For the second time, he has reneged on his solemn commitment to restore the dismissed judges within the agreed timeframe through a parliamentary resolution. On the last occasion, he wriggled out saying the judges could not be restored without a constitutional amendment. We have not heard from him yet why he has broken his word again, but according to reliable media reports, he has linked the question of restoration of the judges with immunity from prosecution for Musharraf and possibly his own candidature for the office of president and has again raised a linkage with constitutional amendments.

Zardari has not explained what the restoration of judges has to do with an amnesty for Musharraf or why Musharraf should not be brought to justice for his deeds. But there is a simple explanation, which can be summed up in three letters: N-R-O. Although Zardari has been acquitted under the NRO on a whole raft of corruption charges, he knows that the validity of this ordinance is highly questionable and could be overturned by an independent judiciary. Therefore, if the Dogar court, which has upheld the ordinance, is to make way for a properly constituted Supreme Court, the least that Zardari would like is that the judgements of the PCO judges and the validity of the NRO should be protected. That was the principal aim of Naek's constitutional package, though it was camouflaged – poorly – as a measure to restore parliamentary democracy. Since these proposals have not been adopted, the attempt of the PPP leadership now is to give validity to the ordinance through the back door under cover of immunity from prosecution for Musharraf which validates all his unconstitutional acts under the PCO and the NRO.

In advocating immunity for Musharraf, some of our politicians have drawn a parallel between the move to impeach him and the pardon given to US President Nixon in 1974 after his resignation when faced with the near certainty of impeachment and conviction. True, both Musharraf and Nixon faced impeachment. But the similarity stops there. Nixon's sin was that he ordered a cover-up of illegal campaign contributions, wiretaps and break-ins. Another American President, Clinton, was impeached on grounds of perjury and obstruction of justice and was acquitted. The alleged offences of Nixon and Clinton are juvenile pranks compared with the misdeeds of Musharraf, which include high treason, the most heinous crime known in criminal law.

Article 6 of the Constitution declares that anyone who subverts the Constitution is guilty of high treason. The punishment for this offence is laid down in the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973. It was precisely for military usurpers like Musharraf that this Article was inserted. To allow him to escape now without answering for his alleged crimes would make a complete mockery of the Constitution; and it would encourage future military adventurers by sending the signal that there would be no accountability for them. This would be a blunder for which future generations might have to pay the price. Musharraf's trial, on the other hand, would deter others of like mind by serving notice that you can run but you can't hide.

Musharraf did it not once but twice. Through the 17th Amendment, he sought to give himself immunity for his first coup. Article 270AA (4) says that no person can be prosecuted for any act done in pursuance of Musharraf's first martial law. But since this Article does not stipulate that it is to take effect "notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution" – as in so many other places where there is a departure from the general provisions of the Constitution – it is at least arguable that the language of Article 270AA is only meant to protect lower level functionaries and does not overrule the specific language of Article 6 for the coup leader. In any case, there is no legal hindrance to Musharraf's prosecution for the second coup.

It is being claimed by some of Musharraf's former aides that he had obtained promises of legal immunity from the ruling coalition before he agreed to resign. However, Naek has denied that, saying there had been "no deal" with the retired general. We do not know which side is telling the truth. But even if an amnesty was promised by Zardari, it is invalid because that would be unconstitutional.

The demand that there should be no revenge against Musharraf is absolutely right. There must be no show trial like the one that he orchestrated after seizing power. He must be given the best legal advice and a completely fair hearing. If his former legal advisers (the Pirzadas and Qayyum) now abandon him, the government should pay the fees of any other lawyer of his choice.

One of the ugliest features of the last days of Musharraf's rule was the way he tried to get the army to take his side in a possible resort to Article 58(2)(b) and sought the support of foreign countries (US, Saudi Arabia, even Britain) to save him form the wrath of the people. He also sought Dogar's support but about that, the less said, the better.

It is more or less confirmed that the message from the army chief that it would not take Musharraf's side if he dissolved the National Assembly played a decisive part in his decision to quit. The Sunday Times reported last week that the military also tried to broker a deal that would allow Musharraf to retire with immunity from prosecution and that it would not allow its former chief to be "humiliated". The army passed its first test by telling Musharraf that it would stay neutral if he resorted to using Article 58(2)(b) -- however, there will be more tests coming, particularly if Musharraf is put on trial. It would regain a lot of the public standing it lost under him if it stays out of any deals to protect him from legal process.

In his desperation, Musharraf also did not shrink from involving foreign countries in Pakistan's domestic politics, bringing discredit upon the country. He asked for a written agreement, to be signed by him, Zardari and Nawaz Sharif and guaranteed by at least two foreign governments, to give him immunity from prosecution. He tried to telephone Bush and "other senior administration figures" (presumably Rice). (They refused to take his calls, the media reported.) A former British ambassador to Pakistan and the Saudi intelligence chief were also involved by Musharraf in his search for a safe exit.

He has now reached the end of the road. He may be free in a technical sense but the only safe place for him outside the former Army House where he is now confined is exile. Abandoned by friends, reviled by the people and facing an uncertain future, he now joins the other former military dictators (Ayub, Yahya, Zia) in the dustbin of history. Like them, Musharraf too came as "saviour" and left the country's institutions in chaos: a constitution that has been put through the shredder twice, a judiciary that is dysfunctional, a military that became deeply entangled in domestic politics and a system of accountability of the political class that stands completely discredited. Musharraf's much-vaunted economic miracle has burst like a bubble. In place of the promised "enlightened moderation," there is rampant terrorism, sectarian strife and insurgency.

The task of rebuilding the institutions crippled by Musharraf must begin immediately. The first priority should be the judiciary but Zardari's delaying tactics are a bad augury. Now comes some more bad news: his possible candidature for the office of president. If Zardari became president, that would be harmful for parliamentary democracy because a president who heads the largest political party will also be the most powerful figure in the country. That would undermine further the position and authority of the present Prime Minister who notionally heads the government. Besides, Zardari's habit of concentrating decision-making in his own hands and ruling through a small coterie of loyalists without regard to competence and institutional structures will take cronyism to new heights and emasculate parliament.

According to the Constitution, the president represents the unity of the Republic. Therefore, he has to be a man of high moral standing who is above party politics. Zardari is hardly the person whose name springs to mind in this connection. There is also the likelihood that if Zardari becomes president, the PPP may not pursue the constitutional amendments necessary to restore the system of parliamentary democracy to which the parties committed themselves in the Charter of Democracy. That would mean more political strife, something we can ill-afford in the present conditions.



The writer is a former member of the Foreign Service of Pakistan. Email: [Only registered and activated users can see links. ]